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Paris, 1956: Moroccan Soldiers, German Sovereignty and a Trip to Paris

By Élise Mazurié

DieMarokkanerKommen.png

“Die Marokkaner kommen!”, Quick, no. 3, 21 January 1956, Stadtarchiv Donaueschingen, 39 2017; 10300, courtesy of Stadtarchiv Donaueschingen

On 16 January 1956, Robert Schrempp, the mayor of Donaueschingen, a small town located in the Black Forest in south-west Germany, and Robert Lienhart, Landrat of the district, travelled to Paris to meet the head of the French defence minister’s cabinet. Their aim was to prevent the planned deployment of Moroccan soldiers serving in the French Army as part of NATO forces in their town.

By the time the two German officials arrived in Paris, the soldiers of the 4th Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains (4th R.T.M.) had already arrived in Germany. They had been sent directly from Morocco to a military training camp located in Stetten am kalten Markt in early December 1955. From there, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th R.T.M reached Donaueschingen on 29 December 1955, while the 1st Battalion was transferred to Reutlingen and the 3rd to Villingen. Gebhard Müller, Minister-President of the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg (where the three towns were located), had previously informed Lienhart of the planned stationing of Moroccan soldiers in the Black Forest region. Both Müller and Lienhart, as well as the mayors of other concerned towns, immediately contacted various French military and German civilian authorities, including Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. At a protest press conference in Villingen in early January 1956, Schrempp reported that he had also been to the German Ministry of Defence in Bonn to plead his case.

 

A week before their trip to Paris, Schrempp and Lienhart had met with French officials in Baden-Baden, the headquarters of French troops in Germany after 1945. During this meeting, the French officials proposed a compromise: to reduce the number of Moroccan soldiers stationed in Donaueschingen from 800 to 400 and to transfer them to the training camp at Stetten in early summer so as not to affect the local tourist industry. In fact, Schrempp and Lienhart had argued that the presence of Moroccan soldiers would have a detrimental impact on the local economy, which relied heavily on tourism in the Black Forest. They reported that several reservations for the coming summer had already been cancelled due to the news of the soldiers’ arrival, including a newly signed contract with a travel company, resulting in a financial loss of 500,000 German marks.

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They had also warned French officials in Germany that if they did not receive a satisfactory reply by 14 January 1956, they were prepared to “go as far as Paris if necessary” to meet General Widmer, head of the French Defence Minister’s cabinet. In support of their arguments, they presented documents from the local archives detailing rapes and other aggressions against German civilians committed by North African soldiers of the French Liberation Army in 1945, providing, what they called, ‘psychological’ reasons against the stationing. Severin Kern, the mayor of the neighbouring town of Villingen, even framed his complaint as a “fight for freedom”.

Photograph of the mayors of Donaueschingen, Robert Schrempp, and Villingen, Severin Kern

Mayor of Donaueschingen, Robert Schrempp (l), and mayor of Villingen, Severin Kern (r), at a press conference in the city hall of Villingen on 10 January 1956, expressing their opposition to the stationing of Moroccan troops. Villingen/Baden-Württemberg/Germany – 22985443, photograph by Willy Antonowitz

Schrempp and Lienhart’s visit to Paris was hardly a success. They were unable to meet General Widmer or the Minister of Defence, General Billotte. Instead, they were welcomed by the assistant General, Commissaire Bertin, who, moreover, soon reneged on his earlier promise to provide written confirmation of the agreement that the German politicians thought they had reached with him. Back in Donaueschingen, Schrempp and Lienhart wrote to Commissaire Bertin expressing that they were “disillusioned” because the French officials had been unable to promise the withdrawal of Moroccan soldiers from the Black Forest. This decision, they argued, would affect Franco-German relations; Schrempp was now unsure whether he would continue to attend events at the invitation of French army officials in Donaueschingen. The city council also, in accordance with French Army officials, introduced a number of pre-emptive measures, notably a ban on local pub owners serving alcoholic beverages to Moroccan soldiers. This move reflected, at least in part, the racist and infantilising assumptions propagated by French Army officials themselves, who portrayed Moroccan soldiers as “easy to tame”, except when drunk.

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Subsequently, the mayors and Lienhart also issued a press release claiming that the French had “shown great understanding for their concerns” but had not been able to address them. In addition to the economic and ‘psychological’ consequences of the stationing of North African soldiers, they also stressed the threat to women walking alone in the streets and the impact on the reputation of the town, which they insisted, “still had a reputation to lose”. This rhetoric of security and economic damage remained a constant theme throughout the stationing of North African soldiers.

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While the impact of the trip to Paris was limited to the regional press, the arrival of the North African soldiers was widely covered by the national and even international press, including Time and Life Magazines. On a national level, the arrival of the troops in Germany and their first days in Donaueschingen were covered by Die Zeit, and the magazine Illustrierte Woche even devoted several sensational pages to the story in its late January issue. Lienhart, ever concerned about his town’s reputation, described the coverage as a “vicious press campaign”, utter “nonsense”, and very detrimental to his efforts to “calm down the local population”. While the wider attention died down after a few weeks, the local press coverage remained constant for the eight years that North African soldiers were stationed in Donaueschingen.

 

Schrempp’s and Lienhart’s trip to Paris, their previous trips to Bonn and Baden-Baden, and the tone of their reports illustrate the extent to which local officials felt entitled to complain to the French authorities and to take action against the presence of North African soldiers in the town and region in which they lived. In the months that followed, individual members of the civilian population would also make similar complaints and express them in letters to the mayors of the different towns. The arguments used by the German officials provide examples of blatant racism and, aligned with views, also present in the higher ranks of the French Army at the time.

 

The episode is significant for its wider historical context. It was only in the summer of 1955 that Germany had transitioned from occupation status to the status of a NATO ally. This determined the mayors’ attitude to the arrival of the North African troops. They framed their complaints in terms of their newly acquired sovereignty and were determined to use their agency as local actors in ways that the occupation had not allowed them to do. However, various justifications for this behaviour, influenced by racist views and a degree of cooperation on the part of the French authorities, contributed to a defiant attitude on the part of the German population and authorities. This attitude persisted for more than a decade in the Black Forest region and beyond. It drove an incessant campaign which only ended with the withdrawal of the last North African regiments in 1963.

 

The involvement of North African soldiers in the French Army on European soil – and European reactions to it – whether during the First World War, the occupations of the Rhineland and the Ruhr in the 1920s, or the Second World War, has received increasing scholarly attention in recent decades. However, their presence, experiences, and perceptions during the post-1945 occupation and the NATO deployment until the mid-1960s have been considerably less well researched. This subject deserves more detailed study as it reveals new dynamics in the context of the Cold War and decolonisation.

Further Reading

  • Adler, Karen H. ‘Indigènes after Indigènes: post-war France and its North African Troops’. European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 20, no. 3 (2013), pp. 463–478.

  • Glöckner, Ann-Kristin. ‘Shared Spaces: Social Encounters between French and Germans in Occupied Freiburg, 1945–55’. In: Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945–55, edited by Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp. 191–210.

  • Miot, Claire. La Première Armée française. De la Provence à l’Allemagne, 1944–1945 (Paris, Perrin 2021).

  • Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945–55, edited by Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

  • Wambach, Julia. ‘Vichy in Baden-Baden – The Personnel of the French Occupation in Germany after 1945’. Contemporary European History 28, no. 3 (2019), pp. 319–341.

About the Author

Elise Mazurie

Élise Mazurié is a doctoral fellow at the DFG Graduate School 2571 “Empires: Dynamic Transformation, Temporality, and Postimperial Orders”, located at the University of Freiburg and a PhD candidate at the Chair for Modern European History (since November 2021). Her doctoral project focuses on soldiers from French colonial territories in North Africa serving in the French Army during the Allied occupation of Germany and beyond, from 1945 to the mid-sixties.

URL: https://www.grk2571.uni-freiburg.de/people/docs/elise-mazurie

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